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ABSTRACT
What is the role of real-time control and learning in the formation of social conventions? To answer
this question, we propose a computational model that matches human behavioral data in a social
decision-making game that was analyzed both in discrete-time and continuous-time setups. Further-
more, unlike previous approaches, our model takes into account the role of sensorimotor control
loops in embodied decision-making scenarios. For this purpose, we introduce the Control-based
Reinforcement Learning (CRL) model. CRL is grounded in the Distributed Adaptive Control (DAC)
theory of mind and brain, where low-level sensorimotor control is modulated through perceptual and
behavioral learning in a layered structure. CRL follows these principles by implementing a feedback
control loop handling the agent’s reactive behaviors (pre-wired reflexes), along with an adaptive layer
that uses reinforcement learning to maximize long-term reward. We test our model in a multi-agent
game-theoretic task in which coordination must be achieved to find an optimal solution. We show that
CRL is able to reach human-level performance on standard game-theoretic metrics such as efficiency
in acquiring rewards and fairness in reward distribution.
Keywords Cognitive Modeling ·Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning · Game Theory · Social Decision-Making ·
Embodied Cognition · Artificial Intelligence · Behavior-based Robotics
1 Introduction
Our life in society is often determined by social conventions that affect our everyday decisions. From the side of the
road we drive on to the way in which we greet each other, we rely on social norms and conventions to regulate these
interactions in the interest of group coordination. But what is a convention, how is it formed and maintained over time?
What cognitive system does an individual need in order to form and maintain such apparently complex behavior? If we
aim to integrate robots or intelligent machines into our daily lives, we have to provide them with cognitive models that
are able to learn and adapt to our social norms and practices.
After decades of research on the topic, the boundaries and relationship between the different categories of social norms
are still under debate [1]. However, both recent [2] and classic [3] literature do agree on their definition: conventions are
patterns of behavior that emerge within a group to solve a repeated coordination problem. More concretely, conventions
exhibit two characteristic features [3]: (i) they are self-sustaining and (ii) they are largely arbitrary. Self-sustaining, in
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the sense that a group of agents in a given population will continue to conform to a particular convention as long as
they expect the others to do so; and arbitrary, in the sense that there are other equally plausible solutions to solve the
same problem. Identifying the set of conditions that lead to the formation of such conventions is still an open question,
traditionally studied through coordination games, a sub-domain of game theory [4].
A typical case for a coordination game is the so-called ’Choosing Sides’. This game proposes a situation in which two
drivers meet in the middle of a narrow road. Both drivers must make a decision to avoid a fatal collision: whether
to turn right or left. If both choose to turn to the same side they will manage to dodge each other, but if they choose
differing maneuvers they will collide. The payoff matrix of Table 1 represents numerically this situation.
Left Right
Left 10, 10 0, 0
Right 0, 0 10, 10
Table 1: Choosing Sides payoff matrix
The solutions to this type of matrix-form game satisfy the two criteria of a convention. First, there are more that one
possible solution (both players choose Left or both choose Right), so choosing one or the other is an arbitrary decision.
And once a solution is reached, it is more optimal for each player to keep their current decision than to change it
unilaterally, so it is also self-sustaining.
Although classical matrix-form games have been extensively investigated in literature over the past decades [5, 6],
several studies point to the fact that coordination in realistic social circumstances usually requires a continuous exchange
of information in order for conventions to emerge [5, 7, 8]. Precisely, this is a feature that classical matrix-form
games lack because they are based on discrete-time turns that impose a significant delay between actions [9, 8, 10].
In order to address this problem, recent literature has devised ways to modify standard game theoretic discrete-time
tasks into dynamic versions where individuals can respond to the other agent’s actions in real or continuous-time
[11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. Their results point out that cooperation can be more readily achieved in the dynamic version of
the task due to the rapid flow of information between individuals and their capacity to react in real-time [12, 17].
A recent example of such an ecological approach can be found in [18], where Hawkins and Goldstone show that
continuous-time interactions help to converge to more stable strategies in a coordination game (the Battle of the Exes)
compared to the same task modeled in discrete-time. They also show that the involved payoffs affect the formation of
social conventions. According to these results, they suggest that real-life coordination problems can be solved either by
a) forming a convention or b) through spontaneous coordination. And, critically, the solution depends on what is at
stake if the coordination fails. To illustrate this point, they suggest two real-life examples of a coordination problem:
On the one hand, when we drive a car, the stakes are high because if we fail to coordinate the outcome could be fatal, so
we resort to a convention – e.g. to drive on the right side of the road. On the other hand, when we try to avoid people in
a crowded street, we do it “on the fly” because the stakes are low, so it is not risky to rely on purely reactive behaviors
(e.g. avoidance behavior) to solve it.
However, despite the substantial amount of behavioral studies and the advances in the development of more ecologically
valid setups, a complete theory of how embodied agents coordinate in real time is still missing. One fundamental step
in this direction will be a model that can account for how lower-level dynamic processes interact with higher-level
(strategic) cognitive processes.
In this work we formalize high-level strategic mechanisms as a model-free RL algorithm, and we formalize low-level
sensorimotor mechanisms as simple control loops. Finally, we develop a model, called Control-based Reinforcement
Learning (CRL), that integrates these two mechanisms as layers in a larger architecture. To do so, we draw upon the
Distributed Adapative Control theory (DAC) [19, 20, 21], that proposes that cognition is based on several control layers
operating at different levels of abstraction. DAC makes explicit the distinction between real-time control on the one
hand (Reactive layer) and perceptual and behavioral learning on the other hand (Adaptive layer). It is, therefore, an
adequate theoretical framework for understanding the specific roles of these two principles (low-level sensorimotor
control and high-level strategic learning) in the formation of social conventions, which is the aim of this paper.
In summary, we introduce a novel two-layered cognitive architecture -CRL- that integrates a low-level reactive control
loop to manage within-round conflicts on rapid time scales, along with a policy learning algorithm to acquire across-
round strategies over longer time scales. We implement this computational model in embodied cognitive agents
involved in a social decision-making task called the Battle of the Exes. We compare performance metrics of the CRL
model to results of human behavioral data published in [18]. We run simulations showing that the modeled cognitive
agents rely more on high-level strategic mechanisms when the stakes of the game are higher. We also show that
low-level sensorimotor control helps enhance performance in terms of efficiency and fairness. These results provide
a computational hypothesis explaining key aspects of the emergence of social conventions such as how cognitive
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processes operating across different temporal scales interact. Finally, we also provide new experimental predictions to
be tested on human behavioral studies.
1.1 Related Literature
As for computational modeling of game-theoretical tasks, there is an extensive body of literature where the study
of the emergence of conflict and cooperation in agent populations has been addressed, especially through the use of
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (for extensive reviews, check [22, 23, 24]). In this direction, a lot of focus has
been recently directed towards developing enhanced versions of the Deep Q-Learning Network architecture proposed
in [25], particularly on their extensions to the social domain [26, 27, 28, 29]. This architecture uses a reinforcement
learning algorithm that extracts abstract features from raw pixels through a deep convolutional network. Along those
lines, some researchers [26, 27, 28] are modeling the type of conflicts represented in the classic game-theoretic tasks
into more ecologically valid environments [26] where agent learning is based on deep Q-networks [27, 28]. For instance,
agents based on this cognitive model are already capable of learning how to play a two-player video game such as Pong
from raw sensory data and achieve human-level performance [25], both in cooperative and competitive modes [29].
Other similar approaches have focused on constructing agent models that achieve good outcomes in general-sum games
and complex social dilemmas, by focusing on maintaining cooperation [30], by making an agent pro-social (taking into
account the other’s rewards) [31] or by conditioning its behavior solely on its outcomes [32].
However, in all of the above cases, the games studied involve social dilemmas that only provide one single cooperative
equilibrium, whereas the case we study in this paper provides several ones, a prerequisite (arbitrariness) for studying
the formation of conventions. Also, the abovementioned examples relax one key assumption of embodied agents, that
is, that sensory inputs must be obtained through one’s own bodily sensors. Agents in previous studies gather their
sensory data from a third person perspective. They are trained using raw pixel data from the screen, in either completely
observable [29, 30, 31, 32] or partially observable [27, 28] conditions. Another point of difference between previous
approaches and the work presented here relates to the continuity of the interaction itself. Most of the work done so
far in multi-agent reinforcement learning using game theoretical setups has been modeled using grid-like or discrete
conditions [26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32]. Although there has been progress insofar many of these studies provide a spatial
and temporal dimension (situatedness) to many classical games, they still lack continuous time properties of real-world
interactions.
Still, there are a few recent cases where the coordination task has been modeled in real-time and the agents are situated
[29, 33, 34]. However, these models suffer from the so-called sample-inefficiency problem due to the huge amount
of episodes they require to reach human level performance. A recent review on Deep Reinforcement Learning [35]
points out that one way to solve the sample-inefficiency problem would be to integrate architectural biases that help
to bootstrap the learning mechanisms by providing some pre-wired adaptation to the environment the agent will live
in. To tackle this issue, the Control-based Reinforcement Learning (CRL) model we introduce in this paper integrates
lower-level sensorimotor control loops that help to bootstrap policy learning on the higher level of the cognitive
architecture. Moreover, we show that the CRL model is sample efficient, by comparing our results to the experimental
human data collected in [18].
In order to do that, in the next section first we begin by describing the benchmark task, a coordination game called the
Battle of the Exes [18]. After that, we present the CRL architecture and its two layers: one dealing with the low-level
intrinsic behaviors of the agent and another based on model-free reinforcement learning, allowing the agents to acquire
rules for maximizing long-term reward [36]. In the Results section, we first compare the results of our model against
the benchmark human data and then we show the contribution of each layer by performing several ablation studies.
Finally, we conclude this paper by discussing the main implications of our findings, and also comment on limitations
and possible extensions of the current model.
2 Methods
2.1 Behavioral Benchmark
The Battle of the Exes is a coordination game similar to the classic Battle of the Sexes [37], that imposes the following
social scenario: A couple just broke up and they do not want to see each other. Both have their coffee break at the same
time, but there are only two coffee shops in the neighborhood: one offers great coffee whereas the other, average coffee.
If both go to the great coffee shop they will come across each other and will not enjoy the break at all. Therefore, if
they want to enjoy their coffee break, they will have to coordinate in a way that they avoid each other every day. This
situation can be modeled within the framework of game theory with a payoff relation such as a > b > 0; where a is the
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payoff for getting the great coffee, b the payoff for the average coffee and 0 the payoff for both players if they go to the
same location.
In [18], Hawkins and Goldstone perform a human behavioral experiment based on the above-mentioned game to
investigate how two factors – the continuity of the interaction (ballistic versus dynamic) and the stakes of the interaction
(high versus low condition) – affect the formation of conventions in a social decision-making task. Concerning the
stakes of the interaction, the payoff matrix is manipulated to create two different conditions: high and low, based on
a bigger and smaller difference between rewards, respectively. The payoff matrices in Figure 1 illustrate these two
conditions.
Figure 1: Payoff matrices of the original “Battle of the Exes” game. The numbers indicate the reward received
by each player (red and blue). Reproduced from [18].
As for the continuity of the interaction, the experiment has a ballistic and a dynamic condition. In the ballistic
condition, as in classical game theory, the players can only choose an action at the beginning of every round of the
game, without any further control on the outcome. However, in the dynamic condition, the players can freely change
the course of their avatars until one of them reaches a reward (for a visual example of the difference between conditions,
check the original videos here). In both conditions, the round ends when one of the players reaches one of the reward
spots that represent the coffee shops. Altogether, this results in four conditions: two for the stakes of the interaction
(high vs. low) combined with two for the continuity of the interaction (ballistic vs. dynamic). For the experiment, they
pair human players in dyads that depending on the payoff condition, play 50 (high) or 60 (low) consecutive rounds
together. In order to analyze the coordination between the players of each dyad, they use three measures -efficiency,
fairness, and stability- based on Binmore’s three levels of priority [38]:
• Efficiency – It measures the cumulative sum of rewards that players were able to earn collectively in each
round, divided by the total amount of possible rewards. If the efficiency value is 1, it means that the players
got the maximum amount of reward.
• Fairness – It quantifies the balance between the earnings of the two players. If the fairness value is 1, it means
that both players earned the higher payoff the same amount of times.
• Stability – It measures how well the strategy is maintained over time. In other words, it quantifies how
predictable the outcomes are of the following rounds based on previous results by “using the information-
theoretic measure of surprisal, which Shannon defined as the negative logarithm of the probability of an event”
[18].
In other words, Efficiency measures utility maximization, Fairness measures the amount of cooperation, and Stability
measures the speed and robustness of conventions formed. The results show that players in the dynamic condition
achieve greater efficiency and fairness than their counterparts in the ballistic condition, both in the high payoff and
low payoff setups. However, their key finding is that in the dynamic condition, the players coordinate more “on the
fly” (i.e. without the need of a long-term strategy) when the payoff is low, but when the payoff is high, the participants
coordinate into more stable strategies. Namely, they identified the stakes of the interaction as a crucial factor in the
formation of social conventions when the interaction happens in real-time.
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2.2 Control-Based Reinforcement Learning
In this section, we introduce our Control-based Reinforcement Learning (CRL) model. The CRL is composed of two
layers, a Reactive and an Adaptive layer. The former governs sensorimotor contingencies of the agent within the rounds
of the game, whereas the latter is in charge of learning across rounds. This is an operational minimal model, where
reinforcement learning interacts with a feedback controller by inhibiting specific reactive behaviors. The CRL is a
model-free approach to reinforcement learning, but with the addition of a reactive controller (for model-based adaptive
control see [39]).
2.2.1 Reactive Layer
The Reactive Layer (RL) represents the agent’s sensorimotor control system and is supposed to be pre-wired (typically
from evolutionary processes in a biological perspective [35]). In the Battle of the Exes game that we are considering
here, we equip agents with two predefined reactive behaviors: reward seeking and collision avoidance. This means that,
even in the absence of any learning process, the agents are intrinsically attracted to the reward spots and avoid colliding
between each other. This intrinsic dynamic will bootstrap learning in the Adaptive Layer, as we shall see.
To model this layer, we follow an approach inspired by Valentino Braitenberg’s Vehicles [40]. These simple vehicles
consist of just a set of sensors and actuators (e.g. motors) that, depending on the type of connections created between
them, can perform complex behaviors. For a visual depiction of the two behaviors (reward seeking and collision
avoidance), see this video.
• The reward seeking behavior is made by a combination of a crossed excitatory connection and a direct
inhibitory connection between the reward spot sensors (s) and the motors (m), plus a forward speed constant
f set to 0.3,
mleft = f + s
X
right − sXleft (1)
mright = f + s
X
left − sXright (2)
where sXleft is the sensor positioned on the left side of the robot indicating the proximity of a reward spot,
and X is either the high (H) or the low reward (L) sensor. The sensors perceive the proximity of the spot.
The closer the reward spots, the higher the sensors will be activated. Therefore, if no reward spot is detected
(sXleft = s
X
right = 0), the robot will go forward at speed f . Otherwise, the most activated sensor (left or right)
will make the robot turn in the direction of the corresponding reward spot.
• The collision avoidance behavior is made by the opposite combination: a direct excitatory connection and a
crossed inhibitory connection, but in this case between the agent sensors (sA) and the motors (m),
mleft = f + s
A
left − sAright (3)
mright = f + s
A
right − sAleft (4)
where sAleft is the sensor positioned on the left side of the robot indicating the proximity of the other agent.
The closer the other agent, the higher the sensors will be activated. In this case as well, if no agent is detected
(sAleft = s
A
right = 0), the robot will go forward at the speed f . Otherwise, the most activated sensor will make
the robot turn in the opposite direction of the other agent, thus avoiding it.
2.2.2 Adaptive Layer
The agent’s Adaptive layer (AL) is based on a model-free reinforcement learning algorithm that endows the agent with
learning capacities for maximizing long-term reward. Functionally, it determines the agent’s action at the beginning of
the round, based on the state of the previous round and its policy. The possible states S are three: high, low and tie; and
they indicate the outcome of the previous round for each agent. That is, if an agent got the high reward on the previous
round, the state is high; if it got the low reward, the state is low; and if both agents went to the same reward, the state is
tie. The actions A are three as well: go to the high, go to the low and none.
The Adaptive Layer implements reinforcement learning for maximizing accumulated reward over rounds through action,
similar to the one implemented in [41] and adapted to operate on discrete state and action spaces. More specifically, we
use an Actor-Critic Temporal Difference Learning algorithm (TD-learning), which is based on the interaction between
two main components:
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Figure 2: Representation of the Control-based Reinforcement Learning (CRL) model. On top, the Adaptive
layer (reinforcement learning control loop) composed of a Critic or value function (V ), an Actor or action policy
(P ), and an inhibitor function (i). At the bottom, the Reactive layer (sensorimotor control loop), composed
of three sets of sensors sH , sL, sA (corresponding to High/Low reward and the other Agent, respectively),
three functions fH , fL, fA (corresponding to High/Low reward seeking and collision avoidance behaviors,
respectively) and two motors ml, mr (corresponding to the left and right motors). The action selected by the AL
is passed through the inhibitor function that will turn off one of the attraction behaviors of the RL depending on
the action selected. If the action is go to the high, the low reward seeking reactive behavior will be inhibited. If
the AL selects go to the low, the RL will inhibit its high reward seeking behavior. If the AL selects none, the RL
will act normally without any inhibition.
• an Actor, or action policy , which learns the mapping from states (s ∈ S) to actions (a ∈ A) and defines what
the action (a) is, based on a probability (P ), to be performed in each state (s);
pi : S ×A→ [0, 1] (5)
pi(a|s) = P (a = at|s = st−1) (6)
• and a Critic, or value function Vpi(s), that estimates the expected accumulated reward (E[R]) of a state (s)
following a policy;
Vpi(st) = E[R] = E[
∞∑
i=0
γir(st+i+1)] (7)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor, and r(si) is the reward at step i.
The Critic also estimates if the Actor performed better or worse than expected, by comparing the observed reward with
the prediction of Vpi(s). This provides a learning signal to the actor for optimizing it, where actions performing better
(resp. worse) than expected are reinforced (resp. diminished). This learning signal is called the temporal-difference
error (TD error). The TD error e(st−1) is computed as a function of the prediction from value function Vpi(s) and the
currently observed reward of a given state r(st),
e(st−1) = r(st) + γVpi(st)− Vpi(st−1) (8)
where γ is a discount factor that is empirically set to 0.40. When e(s) > 0 (respectively e(s) < 0), this means that the
action performed better (resp. worse) than expected. The TD error signal is then sent both to the Actor and back to the
Critic for updating their current values.
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Figure 3: Panel A: Top view of an agent’s body, as represented by the dark-blue large circle. Here the agent is
facing the top of the page. The two thin black rectangles at the sides represent the two wheels, controlled by their
speed. On its front, the agent is equipped with three types of sensors. A: agent sensors (sensing the proximity of
the other agent), L: low reward sensors, and H: high reward sensors. For each type, the agent is able to sense
the proximity of the corresponding entity both on its left and right side (hence six sensors in total). Panel B:
Screenshot of the experimental setup (top view). In blue, the two cognitive agents in their initial position at the
start of a round. In green, the two reward spots; the bigger one representing the high reward and the smaller, the
low reward (i.e. lower payoff). In white, the circles that delimit the tie area.
The Critic (value function) is updated following,
Vpi(st−1) = Vpi(st−1) + ηe(st−1) (9)
where η is a learning rate that is set to 0.15.
The update of the Actor is done in two steps. First, a matrix C(at, st−1), with rows indexed by discrete actions and
columns by discrete states, is updated according to the TD error,
C(at, st−1) = C(at, st−1) + δe(st−1) (10)
where δ is a learning rate that is set to 0.45, at is the current action and st−1 the previous state. C(at, st−1) integrates
the observed TD errors when executing the action at in the state st−1. It is initialized to 0 for all at, st−1 and kept to a
lower bound of 0. C(at, st−1) is then used for updating the probabilities by applying Laplace’s Law of Succession [42],
P (A = at|S = st−1) = C(at, st−1) + 1(∑
a∈A C(at, st−1)
)
+ k
(11)
where k is the number of possible actions.
Laplace’s Law of Succession is a generalized histogram (frequency count) where it is assumed that each value has
already been observed once prior to any actual observation. By doing so it prevents null probabilities (when no data has
been observed, it returns a uniform probability distribution). Therefore, the higher C(at, st−1), the more probable at
will be executed in st−1. Using these equations, actions performing better than expected (e(s) > 0) will increase their
probability to be chosen the next time the agent will be in state st−1. When e(s) < 0, the probability will decrease. If
this probability distribution converges for both agents, we consider that a convention has been attained.
2.3 Multi-Agent Simulations
We follow, as in the Battle of the Exes benchmark [18], a 2x2 between-subjects experimental design. One dimension
represents the ballistic and dynamic versions of the game, whereas the other dimension is composed of the high and
low difference between payoffs. Each condition is played by 50 agents who are paired in dyads and play together 50
rounds of the game if they are in one of the high payoff conditions (ballistic or dynamic), or 60 rounds if they are
in one of the low payoff conditions. Regarding the task, we have developed the two versions (ballistic and dynamic)
of the Battle of the Exes in a 2D simulated robotic environment (see Figure 3B for a visual representation). The
source code to replicate this experiment is available online at: https://gitlab.com/specslab/neurorobotics/
control-reinforcement-learning.
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In the ballistic condition, where there is no possibility of changing the action chosen at the beginning of the round,
agents only use the Adaptive layer to operate. The two first actions (high and low) will take the agent directly to the
respective reward spots, while the none action will choose randomly between them. In each round, the action at chosen
by the AL is sampled according to P (A = at|S = st), where st is the actual state observed by the agent.
In the dynamic condition, the agent uses the whole architecture, with the Adaptive and the Reactive layer working
together (see Figure 2). As in the previous condition, the agent’s AL chooses an action at the beginning of the round,
based on the state of the previous round and its policy. This action is then signaled to the RL, that will inhibit the
opposite reward-attraction reactive behavior according to the action selected by the AL. In the case that the AL chooses
the action go to the high, the RL will inhibit the low reward seeking behavior, allowing the agent to focus only on the
high reward. Conversely, if the AL chooses the action go to the low, the reactive attraction to the high reward will be
inhibited. In both cases, the agent avoidance reactive behavior still operates. Finally, if the action none is selected,
instead of choosing randomly between the other two actions as in the ballistic condition, the AL will rely completely on
the behaviors of the RL to play that round of the game.
The rules of the game are as follows: A round of the game finishes when one of the agents reaches a reward spot. If
both agents are within the white circle area when this happens, the result is considered a tie, and both get 0 points. The
small spot always gives a reward of 1, whereas the big spot gives 2 or 4 depending on the payoff condition (low or high
respectively, see Figure 1). The reward spots are allocated randomly between the two positions at the beginning of each
round.
3 Results
We report the main results of our model simulations in relation to human performance in the Battle of the Exes task
[18], which are analyzed using: efficiency, fairness, and stability [38]. For each of these measures, we report the results
of the model and plot them in contrast with human data from [18]. Then, we interpret those results and analyze the role
of each layer of the CRL architecture in relation to the data obtained in each condition.
Figure 4: Results of Control-based Reinforcement Learning and TD-learning compared to human performance
in the Battle of the Exes game, measured by Efficiency (left), Fairness (center) and Stability (right). The top
panel shows the results on the high-payoff condition. The bottom panel shows the results on the low-payoff
condition. Within each panel, blue bars represent the results in the ballistic condition, and red bars represent the
results in the dynamic condition. Human data from [18]. All error bars reflect standard errors.
Regarding the efficiency scores on the low-payoff condition (see Figure 4, bottom-left panel), first, a non-parametric
Kruskal-Wallis H-test was performed, showing a statistically significant difference between groups (H(3) = 98.9, p <
.001). Post-hoc Mann-Whitney U-tests showed that there were significant differences in efficiency (p < .001) between
8
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humans playing the ballistic conditions (M = 0.70) of the game and the TD-learning benchmark algorithm (M = 0.45).
However, there were no significant differences (p = .34) between human scores in the dynamic condition (M = 0.85)
and the scores achieved by the CRL model (M = 0.86). The same statistical relationships are maintained in the
high-payoff condition (H(3) = 102.29, p < .001), where human ballistic scores (M = 0.69) and TD-learning scores
(M = 0.46) were significantly different (p < .001), while the CRL model (M = 0.88) shows no statistical difference
(p = .26) with human dynamic scores (M = 0.84).
As for the fairness scores on the low-payoff condition (see Figure 4, bottom-center panel), a non-parametric Kruskal-
Wallis showed no statistically significant difference between groups (H(3) = 5.35, p < .001), which means that both
TD-learning (M = 0.61) and the CRL model (M = 0.69) matched human scores on this metric in its respective
ballistic and dynamic conditions (M = 0.61,M = 0.69). The result is similar for the high-payoff condition (see Figure
4, top-center panel). Although this time the Kruskal-Wallis H-test showed a significant difference between groups
(H(3) = 18.74, p < .001), the post-hoc analysis showed no statistical difference (p = .78) between human ballistic
condition (M = 0.50) and TD-learning (M = 0.50), nor between human dynamic condition (M = 0.69) and CRL
(M = 0.68, p = .04).
On the stability metric, the results of the four conditions showed a non-Gaussian distribution, so a non-parametric
Kruskal-Wallis H-test was performed that showed a statistically significant difference between groups (H(3) =
2385.35, p < .001)). The post-hoc Mann-Whitney U-tests showed that both the differences between human ballistic
condition (M = 0.61) and TD-learning (M = 1.18), and between human dynamic condition (M = 0.61) and
CRL model (M = 1.17), were statistically significant (p < .001 on both cases). On the high-payoff condition, a
Kurskal-Wallis also showed significant differences among all stability scores (H(3) = 2569.62, p < .001). Post-hoc
Mann-Whitney U-tests confirmed the statistical difference (p < .001) between human ballistic scores (M = 0.61) and
TD-learning (M = 1.16). Similarly, human dynamic scores (M = 0.56) were significantly smaller (p < .001) than
the ones obtained by the CRL model (M = 1.09).
3.1 Analysis
Overall, the model achieved a good fit with the benchmark data. Like in the human experiment, we observe that the
dynamic (real/continuous-time) version of the model achieves better results in efficiency and fairness and that this
improvement is consistent regardless of the manipulation of the payoff difference.
Figure 5: Top panel: Outcomes of two dyads of CRL agents (dyad 45 on the left, dyad 25 on the right) in the
high dynamic condition, showing the formation of turn-taking (left) and pure dominance (right) equilibria. Each
bar represents the outcome of a round of the game. A red bar means that player 1 got the high reward, and a
blue bar means that player 2 got the high reward. Black bars represent ties. Bottom panel: Surprisal measure
over rounds of play. When a convention is formed, the surprise drops down because the outcomes start to be
predictable.
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The remarkable results in efficiency of the CRL model are due to the key role of the Reactive Layer in avoiding
within-round conflict when both agents have chosen to go to the same reward, a feature that a ballistic model such as
TD-learning lacks. The reactive behavior exhibited by the CRL model represents a kind of ’fight or flight’ response that
can be triggered to make the agent attracted or repulsed to other agents, depending on the context that it finds itself in.
In this case, due to the anti-coordination context presented in the Battle of the Exes, the reactive behavior provides the
agent with a fast (flight) mechanism to avoid conflict. But in a coordination game like the Battle of the Sexes, this same
reactive behavior could be tuned to provide an attraction (fight) response towards the other agent. Future work will
extend this model to observe how the manipulation of this reactive behavior can be learned to help the agent in both
cooperative and competitive scenarios.
As for the results in stability, the model was overall less stable than the human benchmark data, although it reflected
a similar relation between payoff conditions: an increase in stability in the high dynamic condition (M = 1.09 and
M = 1.17) compared to the low dynamic (see Figure 4, right panels). Nonetheless, our results show that social
conventions, such as turn-taking and dominance, can be formed by two CRL agents, as shown in Figure 5. The examples
shown in the figure illustrate how these two conventions were formed in the dynamic high condition, where these
type of equilibria occurred more often and during more rounds than in the other three conditions, thus explaining the
higher stability in this condition. Overall, this results are consistent with human data in that dynamic, continuous-time
interactions help converge to more efficient, fair and stable strategies when the stakes are high.
Model Comparison
Now we analyze the specific contributions of the each layer to the overall results of the CRL architecture. In order
to do that, we perform two model-ablation studies, where we compare the results of the whole CRL model against
versions of itself operating with only one of its two layers. In the first model ablation, we deactivate the Adaptive layer,
so the resulting behavior of the agents is entirely driven by the Reactive layer. In the second model ablation, we do the
opposite so the only layer working is the Adaptive Layer. As in the main experiment, there are two payoff conditions
(high and low) and 50 dyads per condition.
Figure 6: Top panel: Results of the model-ablation experiment compared to the complete CRL results. Red
bars shows the results of the high-payoff conditions, whereas the orange bars refer to the low-payoff conditions.
The ablated model operates using only the Reactive layer’s sensorimotor control. Bottom panel: Results of the
adaptive-only model compared to the complete CRL results. Dark blue shows the results of the high-payoff
conditions, whereas the light blue bars refer to the low-payoff conditions. The adaptive-only operates using
only the Adaptive layer’s TD-learning algorithm. All results are represented in terms of Efficiency (left panel),
Fairness (center) and Stability (right panel). Note that stability is measured by the level of surprisal, which
means that lower surprise values imply higher stability. All error bars reflect standard errors.
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Agents exclusively dependent on the one layer perform worse overall, with a significant drop in efficiency. This drop is
caused by a higher amount of rounds that end up in ties, in which both agents do not receive any reward. The results in
Fairness are comparable to the ones of CRL model. However, note that these results are computed from fewer rounds,
precisely due to the high amount of ties obtained (fairness computes how evenly the high reward is distributed among
agents). Regarding stability, we observe that it is lower than that obtained by the full CRL model, as demonstrated by
higher values in surprise in Figure 6. In summary, we find that any of the layers working alone leads to more unstable
and less efficient results.
In a way, these reactive-only and adaptive-only versions of the model instantiate two different approaches of modeling
cognition and artificial intelligence [43, 44]. On the one side we have the adaptive-only model implementing a TD-
learning algorithm. It represents the symbolic AI tradition, since it works with symbols on a discrete state space [45, 46].
On the other side, the reactive-only model instantiates a pure embodied approach. This model relies only on low-level
sensorimotor control loops to guide the behavior of the agent. Therefore, it represents the bottom-up approach to
cognition of the behavior-based robotics tradition [47, 48]. But, as we have seen, these models alone are not sufficient
to reach human-level performance. Moreover, none of them can match the combination of high-level strategy learning
and embodied dynamics shown by the complete CRL model.
Agents rely more on the Adaptive Layer when stakes are high
We now analyze the participation of each CRL layer across different payoff conditions through the measurement of the
“none” action, which refers to the case when the Adaptive Layer is not used during that trial. Based on the results of the
benchmark and the CRL model in the dynamic condition, where higher payoff differences helped to achieve higher
stability, we expect that the more we increase this difference between payoffs, the more the agents will rely on the
Adaptive layer. For testing this prediction, we have performed a simulation with six different conditions with varying
levels of difference between payoffs (high vs. low reward value), from 1-1 to 32-1. To measure the level of reliance on
each layer, we logged the number of times each agent outputted a none action, that is the action in which the agent
relies completely on the Reactive layer to solve the round.
Figure 7: Mean of the percentage of adaptive layer actions (ie. go to the high and go to the low actions) selected
by the agents plotted against 6 conditions with an increasing difference between high and low payoffs. Bars
reflect standard errors.
Considering that there are only 3 possible actions (’go high’, ’go low’, ’none’), if the Adaptive layer is randomly
choosing the actions, we should observe that the agent selects each action, on average, the same amount of times. That
means that prior to any learning, at the beginning of each dyad, the reliance on the Reactive layer would be 33% and
the reliance on the Adaptive layer 66%. Starting from this point, if our hypothesis is correct, we will expect to observe
an increase in the reliance on the Adaptive layer as the payoff difference increases. As expected, the results confirm,
as seen in Figure 7, that there is a steady increase in the percentage of selection of the Adaptive layer as the payoff
difference augments.
4 Discussion
We have investigated the role of real-time control and learning on the formation of social conventions in a multi-agent
game-theoretic task. Based on principles of distributed adaptive control theory, we have introduced a new Control-based
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Reinforcement Learning (CRL) cognitive architecture. The CRL model uses a model-free approach to reinforcement
learning, but with the addition of a reactive controller. The CRL architecture is composed of a module based on an
actor-critic TD learning algorithm that endows the agent with learning capacities for maximizing long-term reward, and
a low-level sensorimotor control loop handling the agent’s reactive behaviors. This integrated cognitive architecture
is applied to a multi-agent game-theoretic task, the Battle of the Exes, in which coordination between two agents can
be achieved. We have demonstrated that real-time agent interaction does affect the formation of more stable, fair and
effective social conventions when compared to the same task modeled in discrete-time. The results of our model are
consistent with those of Hawkins and Goldstone obtained with human subjects in [18].
Interpreting our results in the context of a functional cognitive model we have elucidated the role of reactive and adaptive
control loops in the formation of social conventions and of spontaneous coordination. We found that the Reactive layer
plays a significant role in avoiding within-round conflict (spontaneous coordination), whereas the Adaptive layer is
required to achieve across-round coordination (social conventions). In addition, the CRL model supports our hypothesis
that higher payoff differences will increase the reliance on the Adaptive layer. Based on the differences obtained
between the ballistic and dynamic conditions, our results might also suggest that initial successful interactions solved
primarily by reactive sensorimotor control can speed up the formation of social conventions.
In our simulations, we have also modeled extensions of experimental conditions (such as increasing differences between
payoffs, presented in Figure 7) which affect task outcomes as well as functionality of each control loop. These results
allow us to make predictions that can later be tested in new human experiments. More concretely, based on our
simulations, we predict that an increased difference in value between the two rewards will promote a faster convergence
towards a convention in cooperation games such as The Battle of the Exes. At the cognitive level we suggest that this
increase in convention formation could be linked to a higher level of top-down cognitive control, as predicted by the
increase in activation of the Adaptive layer of the CRL model.
Furthermore, there is a biological correspondence of the functions identified by modules of the CRL architecture.
Computations described by temporal difference learning have been found in the human brain, particularly in the ventral
striatum and the orbitofrontal cortex [49]. It has also been shown that premotor neurons directly regulate sympathetic
nervous system responses such as fight-or-flight [50]. The top-down control system of the brain has been identified in
the dorsal posterior parietal and frontal cortex, and shown to be involved in cognitive selection of sensory information
and responses. On the other hand, the bottom-up feedback system is linked to the right temporoparietal and ventral
frontal cortex and is activated when behaviorally relevant sensory events are detected [51, 52, 53].
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first embodied and situated cognitive model that is able to match human
behavioral data in a social decision-making game in continuous-time setups. Moreover, unlike previous attempts, we
take into account the role of sensorimotor control loops in solving social coordination problems in real-life scenarios.
This is arguably a fundamental requirement for the development of a fully embodied and situated AI.
Regarding the limits of the model, we observe that the CRL model still does not reach human level performance in
terms of stability. Although the model is quite sample-efficient and reaches good performance in very few trials, it is
clear that it does not learn at the same rate as humans. This is because the model-free algorithm implemented at the
Adaptive layer obviously does not capture the cognitive complexity of strategic human behavior. For instance, people
can inductively abstract to a ’turn-taking’ strategy while the adaptive layer would have to separately learn policies for
the ’up’ and ’down’ states from scratch. This can be clearly seen when the model is compared to human performance in
the ballistic conditions, where only the Adaptive layer is active.
In the end, the CRL model represents a very minimally social model of convention formation (almost as minimal as the
naive RL model of [54]). The only way in which the existence of other agents is incorporated into decision-making is
through the reactive layer’s avoidance mechanism, since its modulated by the presence of the other agent. At most, since
the state variable (s) depends on the actions selected by each agent in the previous round of the game, one could argue
that this variable implicitly takes into account information about the opponent. Besides that, the agents are agnostic
to where the rewards are coming from, and certainly not representing and updating the other agents’ latent policy or
engaging in any kind of social cognition when planning.
But, how much cognitive sophistication is really needed to find solutions to social coordination problems? Our results
suggest that we do not need to invoke any advanced social reasoning capabilities for achieving successful embodied
social coordination. At least, on this type of coordination problems. Arguably in more complex social scenarios (e.g.
generalizing or transferring conventions from one environment to another) a certain level of social representation may
become necessary.
For future work, there are several directions in which we can continue to develop reserach presented in this paper.
One obvious extension would be to make the CRL model social. This could be done by representing its partner as an
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intentional agent or trying to predict and learn what its partner is going to do (as inverse RL, or Bayesian convention
formation theories do).
Another possibility is the addition of a memory module to the CRL architecture. As discussed in [20, 36], this will
facilitate the integration of sensory-motor contingencies into a long-term memory that allows for learning of rules.
This is important for building causal models of the world and taking into account context in the learning of optimal
action policies. The goal of such extensions can be to build meta-learning mechanisms that can identify the particular
social scenario in which an agent is placed (i.e., social dilemmas, coordination problems, etc.) and then learn the
appropriate policy for each context. Extending our model with such functionality could enable solving more diverse
and complicated social coordination problems, both at the dyadic and at the population levels.
Lastly, another interesting avenue concerns the emergence of communication. We could extend our model by adding
signaling behaviors to agents and testing them in experimental setups similar to the seminal sender-receiver games
proposed by Lewis [3]. One could also follow a more robot-centric approach such as that of [55, 56]. These approaches
enable one to study the emergence of complex communicative systems embedding a proto-syntax [41, 57].
Put together, our model in this paper along with recent related work (see [44]) helps towards advancing our understanding
of a functional embodied and situated AI that can operate in a multi-agent social environment. For this purpose, we
plan to extend this model to study other aspects of cooperation such as in wolf-pack hunting behavior [58, 59], and also
aspects of competition within agent populations as in predator-prey scenarios. In ongoing work, we are developing
a setup in which embodied cognitive agents will have to compete for limited resources in complex multi-agent
environments. This setup will also allow us to test the hypothesis proposed in [60, 61, 62] concerning the role of
consciousness as an evolutionary game-theoretic strategy that might have resulted through natural selection triggered by
a cognitive arms-race between goal-oriented agents competing for limited resources in a social world.
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